The effects of pension-related policies on household spending by Párraga Rodríguez, Susana
THE EFFECTS OF PENSION-RELATED 
POLICIES ON HOUSEHOLD SPENDING
Susana Párraga Rodríguez
Documentos de Trabajo 
N.º 1913
2019
THE EFFECTS OF PENSION-RELATED POLICIES ON HOUSEHOLD SPENDING
THE EFFECTS OF PENSION-RELATED POLICIES ON HOUSEHOLD 
SPENDING
Susana Párraga Rodríguez (*)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 1913
2019
(*) Banco de España. Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research, Alcalá 48, 28014 Madrid, Spain. 
Email: susana.parraga@bde.es. The author declares that she has no relevant or material financial interests that 
relate to the research described in this paper. This work was conducted at University College London before the 
author joined the Bank of Spain. The views expressed in this paper are therefore those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Banco de España. I am very grateful to the Banco de España for their financial 
assistance, and for comments and advice from, and discussions with, Clodomiro Ferreira, José María Labeaga, 
Ralph Luetticke, Francisco Martí, Morten Ravn, Raffaelle Rossi, João Santos Silva, and Ernesto Villanueva
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and fi nance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, 
do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the Internet at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged.  
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2019
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line)
Abstract
This paper estimates the impact of pension-related policies on household spending. The 
identifi cation strategy exploits the deviation in pensioner income and expenditure caused by 
the introduction of a new pension system during the 1980s and 1990s in Spain and constructs 
a new narrative series of legislated pension changes. I present a variety of estimates, some 
of them imply that increases in the average pension have a roughly one-for-one effect on 
pensioner spending. The strongest effects are on the pensioners with the highest levels of 
expenditure, income, and wealth. Estimates for different categories of expenditure indicate 
that benefi t increases trigger these pensioners to spend more on durables. At the same time, 
pension-related policies targeted to pensioners with low income levels seem to affect the 
spending on non-durables and necessities such as food positively.
Keywords: fi scal policy, narrative public pensions changes, household expenditure.
JEL classifi cation: D12, H31, H55, N14.
Resumen
Este documento estima el impacto de las políticas de pensiones en el gasto de los 
hogares. La estrategia de identifi cación utiliza la desviación de los ingresos y del gasto 
de los pensionistas causada por la introducción de un nuevo sistema de pensiones 
durante las décadas de los años 1980 y 1990 en España, y construye una nueva serie 
narrativa de cambios legislados en el sistema de pensiones. Se presentan una variedad 
de estimaciones, algunas de las cuales implican que los aumentos en la pensión media 
tienen un efecto de, aproximadamente, uno por uno en el gasto de los pensionistas. Los 
efectos más signifi cativos afectan a los pensionistas con altos niveles de gasto, de renta 
y de riqueza. Estimaciones para diferentes categorías de gasto indican que el aumento de 
las prestaciones induce a estos pensionistas a gastar más en bienes duraderos. Al mismo 
tiempo, las políticas de pensiones dirigidas a los pensionistas con menor nivel de renta 
parecen infl uir positivamente en el gasto en bienes no duraderos y de primera necesidad 
como alimentación.
Palabras clave: política fi scal, narrativa de cambios en las pensiones públicas, gasto de 
los hogares.
Códigos JEL: D12, H31, H55, N14.
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1 Introduction
Concerns about financial sustainability and the projected population aging have led to a renewed
interest in pension systems. As a result, the research agenda has turned attention to the economic
impact of social security benefits. Recent papers have made progress in the quantification of
the aggregate effects of pension-related policies (see, for example, Romer and Romer 2016,
and Parraga-Rodriguez 2016, 2018); however, the question remains what the direct impact of
pension-related policies on household spending is. Filling this gap in the literature is essential
because estimates of the effects of pension-related policies on the aggregate economy cannot
fully explain the distributional impacts of changes in benefits.
This paper presents evidence on the impact of unexpected permanent changes in public pen-
sions on net recipients (pensioners). Consistent with the lifecycle/permanent-income hypothesis
of consumption theory, increases in the average pension have a roughly one-for-one effect on
pensioner spending. To gain insights into the components of these high responses, I look into
the implied impact for different categories of expenditure, as well as across the distribution of
pensioners’ spending, income and wealth.
My findings have significant implications for the growing macroeconomic literature on the
heterogeneous effects of fiscal policy. First, the results seem to be driven by the consumption,
income and wealth-rich pensioners. Second, not only do I find different effects across the distri-
bution of household expenditure, but also by categories of expenditure. Pensioners at the bottom
of the distribution of expenditure appear to spend increases in benefits mostly on non-durables
and necessities such as food, whereas pensioners at the top allocate a substantial fraction of
the benefit increases to durables. Third, a simple classification concerning net worth suffices
to obtain significant heterogeneous effects out of benefit increases regarding wealth. The latter
contrasts with the recent theoretical advances in heterogeneous agent models that fiscal policy is
more effective the more significant the proportion of liquidity-constrained households (Kaplan
and Violante 2014, Eggertsson and Krugman 2012). The results also contrast with the empirical
works that study the heterogeneous effects of temporary tax changes (Cloyne and Surico 2016,
Misra and Surico 2014). A comparison with these papers points to the lower outstanding debt
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of the elderly, compared to working-age individuals, as the primary explanatory factor for the
divergences.
The estimation method exploits the significant departure in the spending path of pensioners
caused by the introduction of a new welfare state legislation in Spain during the 1980s and
1990s. In the framework of difference-in-difference (DD) models for multiple policy interven-
tions, I estimate the impact of changes in the average pension, an aggregate fiscal variable,
on household-level spending from survey data corresponding to 1977q2-1997q1. This strat-
egy circumvents the lack of data on household income in the survey covering the essential
pre-treatment years. The DD framework is an attractive method because it recognizes that in
the absence of random assignment, treatment and control groups may differ for many reasons.
The eligibility to collect a pension defines the treatment and control groups such that only
the treated (pensioners) receive the benefits increase. The control group consists of working-
age households net contributors to the pension system. A sufficiently high age-threshold for
working-age households guarantees the comparability of both groups. Compared to the stan-
dard DD exercise though, all households might be potentially affected by aggregate shocks
such as pension-related policies. Even so, I show that if pensioners and workers are similarly
affected by increases in aggregate income, time effects will efficiently control for the general
equilibrium effects in the regressions.
Like Stephens (2003), I study the consumption behavior of Social Security beneficiaries.
Stephens (2003) estimates the consumption response to the regular arrival of Social Security
checks exploiting the fact that participation in the Consumer Expenditure Survey is indepen-
dent of the date the checks arrive. However, whereas he studies how recipients react to known
3check amounts, this paper estimates the consumption response to surprise changes in pensions.
Indeed, he excludes any observations within the window around the arrival of checks with
unknown amounts that incorporate cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). Wilcox (1989) and
Romer and Romer (2016) exploit the variation in the COLAs to estimate the aggregate effects
of benefit increases. Compared to them, this paper does a better control of the potential estima-
tion bias due to the positive correlation between inflation adjustments, current macroeconomic
conditions, and benefit increases.
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The identification strategy to deal with the reverse causality in the relationship between
pension-related policies and household spending is to use a narrative approach. This paper
presents a new narrative series of legislated changes in public pensions adopted in Spain be-
tween 1979 and 1997. Marked by the Spanish Constitution of December 1978, the narrative
covers the implementation of a new Social Security system in Spain, with significant variation
in pension-related policies. The result of the narrative analysis is a record of likely exogenous
pension-related policies that will be used as an instrumental variable for aggregate expenditure
in public pensions to estimate the effects of changes in the average allowance.
Last but not least, the high estimates for pensioners’ spending out of benefit increases point
to a significant impact on aggregate consumption and output. However, to correctly quantify the
aggregate effects of benefit increases, one needs to account for the general equilibrium effects
that could have amplified or diminished the initial impulse to spending. Still, this paper provides
sound evidence to support the implicit assumption made in research using aggregate data that
recipients of social security benefits have high marginal propensity to consume, especially for
durables expenditure.
The next section gives details on the construction of the new narrative series of exogenous
pension-related policies and the household expenditure surveys. Section 3 presents the empiri-
cal design. Once section 4 establishes a robust and significant impact of unexpected permanent
The estimation sample corresponds to the implementation of a new welfare state in Spain. In
this new system, public pensions became the most important component of public expenditure.
According to OECD, the average expenditure on public pensions in Spain during 1985-1997
was 10.6% of GDP, above the average for OECD countries (8.9%). During this period, public
pensions accounted, on average, about 25% of total public spending.1
changes in public pensions on pensioners’ spending, section 5 reports the heterogeneous effects
of pension-related policies on household spending. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 Dataset
2.1 Institutional background
1The Ministry of Finance Macroeconomic Database of the Spanish Economy.
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Within contingencies, old-age pensions account for more than 60% of total expenditure on
On the other hand, those who can prove need but have not made sufficient contributions are
eligible for a non-contributory pension. These pensions cover the contingencies of old age and
disability. General taxes and government transfers finance non-contributory pensions. Taking
into account those who receive a minimum pension supplement, about 30% of beneficiaries
receive a non-contributory pension.5 Regarding the entitlements, non-contributory pensions
pay subsistence benefits, as highlighted by the fact that the minimum old-age pension for those
over 65 did not match the legal minimum wage until 1990.
2Data sources: Ministry of Labor and Social Security and Ministry of Economy.
3See Monasterio et al. (1996).
4According to the earliest data available from OECD pensions database, and as documented by Luengo-Prado
and Sevilla (2013), total assets in private pension funds were about 2% in 2001, compared with 75% in the US.
5Data from the National Institute of Social Security.
Public pensions in Spain are a pay-as-you-go system of defined benefits. There exist two
primary modalities, contributory pensions covering the contingencies of old age, disability and
survivors, and non-contributory pensions for old age and disability. Social contributions carry
the weight in the financing of contributory pensions. For example, in 1980 contributions for
social insurance accounted for 89.4% of total revenues into the Social Security, while in 1990,
social contributions accounted for 71.9% of total revenues, a fall mainly explained by the sharp
rise in the government transfers to the Social Security to finance the public health care. The
benefits amount depends on the number of years a worker contributes to the system and the
contribution basis. Benefit amounts below a minimum threshold are topped-up to guarantee a
minimum pension. Pensions cannot exceed a maximum benefit amount established by the law
either.
public pensions (see Appendix A1). In the sample period, the normal retirement age was 65
years old, although early retirement was possible without penalty in certain professions, and
with a penalty for all other employees. The old-age benefit ratio (the ratio between the average
old-age pension benefit and the economy-wide average wage) increased substantially during the
sample period. In 1980 the benefit ratio was 28%, compared to 32% in 1997.2 Moreover, the
replacement rate at retirement (the average first pension as a share of the economy-wide average
wage at retirement) was above 80% by 1995.3 The little importance of private pension plans in
Spain can partly explain these high replacement rates.4
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2.2 Narrative series of pension-related policies
Directly using benefits income to estimate the impact of pension-related policies on household
spending would ignore endogeneity problems. In other words, pension-related policies that
respond to short-run macroeconomic developments fail to isolate the effect of other shocks
affecting household spending, therefore producing biased estimates. In this regard, inflation
adjustments are a special feature of Social Security benefits compared to other forms of public
Another endogeneity problem relates to how the timing of policies might depend on the
available fiscal space, which in turn, partly depends on the economic cycle. However, the
evolution of expenditure in public pensions does not seem to be conditioned by the balance of
the Social Security budget. During the 1980s and early 1990s, many policies were implemented
to improve the generosity and coverage of the Social Security system, but without an equivalent
counterpart to the financing of the same. In other words, with the establishment of democracy
takes place an accelerated formation of the welfare state in Spain. Carreras and Tafunell (2010)
document that while the welfare state represented only 13 percent of GDP in 1970, its weight
increased to about 25 percent by 1985. Among expenditure items, public pensions more than
doubled their share of GDP, reaching a ratio of 10 percent of GDP in 1985, compared to 4
percent in 1970, and absorbing a quarter of total public expenditure.
6Until 1986 pensions indexation effectively based on the year-on-year change in CPI December. After, index-
ation used the CPI November.
spending. To the extent that inflation might reflect the recent economic evolution, it is necessary
to purge the benefits series from changes directly attributable to inflation.
Figure 1 plots the inflation rate as measured by the year-to-year change in CPI December to-
gether with the evolution in the average benefits per pensioner. The close evolution of inflation
and the growth of average benefits suggests a potential endogeneity problem. Put it differ-
ently, the high correlation between both series makes a necessity to account for the relationship
between inflation and pension adjustments to determine the causal effects of pension-related
policies. However, growth in average benefits tends to exceed the inflation rate with a changing
gap. Using the year-on-year change in CPI November instead would result in similar gaps.6
These frequent and heterogeneous gaps suggest that other factors besides inflation determine
increases in average benefits.
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new narrative series of legislated changes in public pensions adopted in Spain between 1979
and 1997. Because current macroeconomic developments, including inflation or the available
fiscal space, may determine pension-related policies, I exclude interventions with short-run sta-
bilization goals as the primary motive. As a norm, I also discount the inflation rate from all
benefit increases. The result of the narrative analysis is a record of likely exogenous pension-
related policies to be used as an instrument for retirement income. Because pension-related
policies affect household spending through changing their disposable income, one could use
the exogenous pension-related policies to identify the exogenous variation in household income
and estimate the effects on household spending. However, the household survey corresponding
to the early period of the estimation sample, the the Encuesta Permanente de Consumo (EPC),
does not report information on household income. Even so, using this survey is essential to
Figure 1: Inflation and Public Pensions, 1978-1997
The identification strategy to control for reverse causality in the relationship between pension-
related policies and household spending is to use a narrative approach. This paper presents a
Notes: The plots show average benefits per recipient and CPI December. The vertical line indicates the waves of
the expenditure survey. Authors calculations using data from the Annex of the Economic and Financial Reports to
the Social Security Budget, and National Institute of Statistics.
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guarantee a sufficient number of periods before the treatment begins. Then, since the goal is
to estimate the effects of pension-related policies on household expenditure, the narrative se-
ries will be used instead to instrument aggregate expenditure in public pensions to estimate the
impact of changes in the average allowance.
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Multiple sources have been used to identify and analyze the policy changes. The Economic
and Financial Reports to the State Budgets (IEF by its abbreviation in Spanish) - a detailed
account of the economic context, the government goals and spending policies involved in the
Budget Law- served as a starting point for identifying significant policy changes.7 These reports
have been digitalized and are available online since 2000.8 On can find hard copies of reports
for earlier fiscal years in the library of Banco de Espan˜a.9 After identifying the laws, I used the
Spanish Official State Bulletin (BOE for its acronym in Spanish) to collect the legislative texts
of the enacted laws. News articles, mainly from the digital archive of El Paı´s where occasionally
used to fill information gaps.10 This line of action makes it very likely to identify the majority
and most significant policy measures.
The narrative analysis categorizes policies as either exogenous or not exogenous based on
their motivation. Examination of the introductory comments of each bill, press releases, media
news, and different reports was used to assess the motivation of each measure. I establish three
exogenous motivations based on similar classifications by Romer and Romer (2016), Cloyne
(2013), and Gil et al. (2017). First, “ideological” changes due to philosophical reasons such
as fairness or redistribution. For example, the introduction of new benefits for the social in-
tegration of the disabled in 1984, or the introduction in 1985 of a war pension for those who
7The Economic and Financial Reports analyze the main characteristics and figures of the State Budget. The
Reports consist of three parts. The first part describes the economic context of the State Budgets. The second part
describes the government priorities and main characteristics of the Budgets, as well as an analysis of the spending
policies that make them up. The third part analyses the budgets for different agencies integrated into the general
government, including the Social Security.
8http://www.sepg.pap.minhafp.gob.es/sitios/sepg/es-ES/Presupuestos/InformeEconomicoFinanciero
9For missing volumes one can use as an alternative the proposal of State Budget.
10This is done introducing in the archive’s searcher keywords related to a particular policy and in a window
around the vicinity of the event.
fought for the losing side in the Spanish Civil War. From all types of measures with an ideo-
logical motivation, rises of minimum and non-contributory pensions stand out because of their
quantity and importance in the budget. Discussions about these measures in the legal texts and
reports often involve motivations such as “to improve the level of social protection, political will
to increase minimum pensions above the CPI, equation of the minimum pensions to the legal
minimum wage, equation of the minimum survivors [widows] pension with the amount of the
minimum individual retirement pension,”.
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Second, increases in benefits other than minimum and non-contributory pensions constitute
another category of “purchasing power” improvements beyond (or below) the annual change in
CPI. Due to concerns about the correlation between inflation and the short-run macroeconomic
conditions, the impact of all policies employs as a benchmark the annual increases in pensions
equal to the inflation rate. Besides, the calculations also net out the evolution in the number of
beneficiaries and the higher value of new pensions compared to existing ones.
As shown in Figure (1), often there is a gap between the inflation rate and the growth rate
of average benefits. One explanation could be that policymakers repeatedly miscalculated their
inflation forecasts, which, by law, were used to set the annual inflation adjustments. The latter
seems unlikely given that the number of continuous and significant gaps extends for more than
a decade. Additionally, during another entire decade starting in 1999 indexation of contributory
pensions perfectly matched CPI inflation. Therefore, these gaps may also reflect discretionary
increases in pensions because of ideological motivations and with the aim of improving the
purchasing power of pensioners. The empirical strategy is to use these measures in the base-
line estimates while addressing any remaining doubts about their exogeneity in the robustness
section. As shown later on, the exclusion of these measures does not significantly influence the
estimates obtained.
Finally, we find policies caused by a structural reform with long-run objectives such as fiscal
consolidations or to address challenges stemming from demographic phenomena. This category
also includes reforms and changes in expenditure the result of a court ruling. Unlike other
spending items, there tend to be fewer reductions in pensions to improve the budget balance
in the short term. For example, in the IEF for 1990 we find “The content of the State Budget
for 1990 has an important social character [e.g., spending in public pensions], although this
does not imply neglecting the conservative economic policy applied in recent years”. In the
IEF for 1993 similar remarks were made, adding “The effort of spending restraint has been
concentrated on the other spending items [instead of social spending such as pensions], with
reductions or increases that in practice represent a freeze in nominal terms.” Other reports and
for different years include similar remarks.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1913
The previous three categories cover most of the contingencies regarding pension-related poli-
cies. For the remaining policies, those in compensation for other fiscal actions, or to boost
economic growth in the short run have been classified as endogenous because of their counter-
cyclical motivation. Reassignments of some benefits over time, which do not imply a change in
coverage, have not been considered as a policy.
In total, 64 exogenous pension-related policies are identified, with 47 policies taking place
after 1985. While there are roughly the same amount of actions by type of benefits (contribu-
tory, minimum, non-contributory, and other pensions), ideological reasons seem to be the most
common motivation. Combining all the changes for the different benefits yields a total of 27
economic shocks, of which only three correspond to net reductions of benefits. The narrative
series has been quantified in annualized terms, that is, as the additional expenditure equivalent
to one fiscal year as a result of a legislated change in pensions. The final series is in real and
per beneficiary terms, dividing by the CPI general index with base 1992 and the total num-
ber of pensions (contributory and non-contributory). The cumulative yearly impact of pension
changes is on average 4,552 pesetas (about 28 euros) per beneficiary, at 1992 prices. This im-
pact rises to 6,676 pesetas per beneficiary when we only account for net increases. All official
sources indicate the date of enactment; I follow Romer and Romer (2016) and consider that a
policy is effective when beneficiaries cash in the pensions. Then, policies are assigned to the
quarter when they become active. For example, while Congress usually passes the State Budget
in the last quarter of the year, we attribute budget policies to January of the following year (1st
quarter).
For comparability with the literature, Figure 2 shows the narrative series normalized by GDP.
Compared to other fiscal instruments, the budgetary impact of increases in pensions is rather
small. For example, Gil et al. (2017) estimate a yearly amount of permanent tax cuts in Spain
of about 0.25% of GDP (0.22% for increases) between 1986 and 2015. In contrast, pension
increases have an average impact of 0.07% of GDP for a similar sample from 1986 to 2014.
The appendix A2 contains further details on all identified policies during the narrative analysis
corresponding to 1979-97. Details of the Spanish pension system were provided earlier in the
text.
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Sample restrictions - While the complete narrative analysis covers legislated changes in pub-
lic pensions adopted until 2014, this paper restricts attention to policy actions during 1979-1997.
This sample choice responds to various reasons. First, starting in 1998 the new household ex-
penditure surveys are not directly comparable with the earlier waves. For example, the survey
corresponding to 1998-2005 uses a different classification for goods and services and scheme
of household participation. While households report on all their spending in the surveys until
1997, in the survey corresponding to 1998-2005 households alternate between reporting all their
spending (full participation) and their infrequent spending such as durable goods purchased dur-
ing the three months before their interview (partial participation). The scheme of participation
for a household participating eight consecutive quarters would have been G G g g G G g g,
where G denotes full reporting and g denotes partial participation. Since 2006 the expendi-
ture survey has changed to annual frequency. Second, the starting date in the first quarter of
1979 guarantees a period of relatively institutional stability. The death of the dictator Francisco
Notes: The plot shows the combined changes in contributory, minimum, non-contributory, and other pensions as
percentage of GDP corresponding to 1979-1997
-0
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Figure 2: Pension-Related Policy Changes as Percentage of GDP
Franco in November 1975 marked the beginning of a transition period to a new democratic
regime. In this historical context, the Spanish Constitution of December 1978 established the
basis for the current system of Social Security. Therefore, the narrative analysis starts within the
initial years of a new welfare system and covers a period with substantial variation in spending
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on public pensions. Later, one finds a relatively infrequent policy activity. For example, during
an entire decade starting in 1999 indexation of contributory pensions perfectly matched CPI
inflation. Finally, data restrictions and the availability of reports from government agencies also
determine the starting point.
Predictability tests - Next, I analyze the predictability of the exogenous pension-related poli-
cies to past macro developments in output, inflation, other fiscal policies or the monetary policy
stance. These are standard tests that the literature on narrative fiscal changes has proposed as
a suggestive alternative to the non-testable exogeneity assumption (see, for example, Gil et al.
2017). The results in Table 1 uniformly indicate that macro developments do not help forecast
decisions on pension-related policies or their magnitude. First, I fit a linear regression for the
narrative series on four lags of the same and the log of GDP, CPI inflation, the average implicit
personal income tax rate, and the short-term interest rate to perform an F-test of the joint signif-
icance of the macro covariates. Second, using the same covariates and lag length, I perform a
VAR Granger causality test. Next, following Mertens and Ravn (2012), I test whether the deci-
sions on pension-related policies can be forecasted by past information using an ordered probit
approach. These tests require constructing an indicator variable based on the enactment date
rather than the implementation date that takes the value 1 (-1) at the announcement of benefit
increases (cuts), and 0 otherwise. The predictability of pension-related policy announcements is
assessed using a likelihood ratio test on ordered probit regressions with and without the macro
covariates. The third and fourth rows of Table 1 show the p-value for these tests of the macro
aggregates having no predictive power on the timing of legislated pension-related policies. The
Notes: p-value of predictability tests for the amount and timing of exogenous pension-related policies. Full Sample
from 1979q1:1997q4; ECPF85 sample in column 2 from 1985q1:1997q4. Macro variables include the log of GDP,
CPI inflation, the average implicit personal income tax rate, and the short-term interest rate. All regressions include
four lags of the macro variables and the narrative series.
Table 1: Predictability Tests
(1) (2)
Full sample ECPF85
F-test 0.480 0.875
Granger Causality 0.310 0.543
Ordered Probit Enactment Date 0.390 0.235
Ordered Probit Implementation Date 0.388 0.659
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fourth line performs a similar likelihood ratio test but defining the dependent variable at the
implementation date instead. Again, the last two tests also include four lags of the covariates
and the dependent variable.
2.3 The Spanish household expenditure surveys
The household level data for this paper comes from two quarterly Spanish household expen-
diture surveys, the Encuesta Permanente de Consumo (EPC) and the Encuesta Continua de
Presupuestos Familiares (ECPF85). The EPC was carried out from the 2nd quarter of 1977
to the 4th quarter of 1983, while the ECPF85 corresponds to 1985-97. Therefore, the sam-
ple period spans from the 2nd quarter of 1977 to the 1st quarter of 1997. Based on personal
interviews and expenditure diaries, these surveys report detailed information on households
expenditure and other characteristics, albeit only the ECPF85 includes data on household in-
come. The earlier survey interviewed about 2,000 families every quarter, while the ECPF85
interviewed about 3,200 families. In either survey part of the sample is renewed each period,
which yields an unbalanced panel. While we observe some households for up to 24 quarters in
the EPC, participation in the ECPF85 shortens to a maximum of 8 consecutive quarters.
The eligibility to collect a pension defines the treatment and control groups such that only the
treated receive the benefit increases. Given that old-age pensions represent the bulk of social se-
curity benefits (see section 2.1 or appendix A1) and the need to minimize composition changes,
retirement status defines the treatment and control groups. The treated consist of households
with a reference person collecting benefits since their first interview in either of the surveys.
Moreover, their age is restricted to be at least 58 years old at the time of their first interview.
The age threshold is set lower than 65 to cover cases of early retirement. By definition, the
treated include households collecting benefits and no longer paying social contributions. In
other words, net recipients at the time of a pension-related policy. I will refer to this group as
the “pensioners”.
The control group consists of households with a reference person in working-age but not
entitled to a pension. Out of lack of a better name, I will refer to the control group as the “work-
ers”. Even if the reference earner might not collect a pension, the household could nonetheless
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Table 2 compares pensioners and workers. The estimation sample has more observations for
11Between 1977 and 1984 the total social insurance rate fell 10 pp, followed by a stable 28.8% rate between
1985 and 1992. After that, although the tax rate temporally rose half percentage point in 1993-94, a new lower
28.3% rate since 1995 counterbalanced any previous hikes. Even so, the evolution of the rates might not entirely
reflect the growth of the average contribution for social insurance, which decreased between 1977 and 1985 but
showed an upward trend after that.
workers than pensioners. Workers also contribute a larger share into total expenditure, 77.8%
compared to 23.4%. Regarding characteristics of the reference person (lines 3-5), pensioners
and workers differ in characteristics other than age. Pensioners are on average less educated
than workers and over three times more likely to be a woman. Not surprisingly either, workers
receive benefits through other earners. Families with another earner older than 58 have been
excluded to avoid this circumstance. I have also dropped households whenever the reference
person is less than 25 or over 58 years old by their last interview. The lower-bound on age
allows taking the education decision as given, while the upper-bound has a twofold purpose.
Firstly, setting an upper bound lower than the standard retirement age minimizes composition
changes attributable to pension-related policies, which would invalidate the grouping of house-
holds according to retirement status. Secondly, unlike the standard difference-in-difference
(DD) exercise, the treatment affects both the treated (pensioners) and the non-treated (workers)
because all households are affected by aggregate shocks like pension-related policies. Given
positive multiplier effects, increases in benefits might lead to higher national income. A high
age threshold for the control group makes it more likely that pensioners and workers are affected
similarly by general equilibrium effects amid increases in aggregate income.
On the other hand, a pay-as-you-go pension system finances benefit increases with current
social insurance contributions, which might induce workers to cut consumption. The control
group includes households which are net contributors at the time of a pension-related policy.
It includes families paying social security insurance but not entitled to any benefits. Thus, if
benefit increases triggered changes in taxation that induced households to cut spending, one
might worry that contemporary policy changes affecting workers could positively bias the DD
estimates. However, there is little evidence of contemporaneous changes in the taxation of
personal income. For example, the general social insurance rate mainly decreased or remained
unchanged over the sample period.11 Nevertheless, the robustness checks will include controls
for other policy changes related to the taxation of personal income.
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have larger household sizes.12 Regarding median levels of expenditure (lines 8-12), the table
indicates that pensioners have a lower level of total expenditure. In relative terms, pensioners
also spend on average a larger fraction of non-durables, while workers spend more on durables.
Finally, lines 13-14 report that pensioners have a higher rate of homeownership. Although the
surveys do not contain direct information about households wealth, real state variables indicate
that pensioners are wealthier than workers. Moreover, although the surveys do not distinguish
between mortgagors and non-mortgagors, the one-time surveys of 1980-81 and 1990-91 reveal
Table 2: Comparison of Characteristics of Pensioners and Workers
Pensioners Workers
Observations 45,115 89,550
Share in aggr. expenditure 23.4% 77.8%
Age 71 43
Spouse’s age 66 40
College education 2.9% 9.7%
Female 28.8% 9.0%
Household size 2.4 4.1
Total expenditure 170,386 pts 189,834 pts
Non-durables 143,043 pts 150,933 pts
Durables 18,275 pts 30,238 pts
Food 54,849 pts 52,974 pts
Homeownership 81.2% 74.5%
Other real estate 9.4% 10.4%
12See Attanasio and Weber 2010 and references therein for other papers documenting this fact.
Notes: The share in aggregate expenditure refers to the average share over 1977q2-1997q1. Age, education,
and sex of the reference person. The household size is measured as the number of family members. Median
expenditures per equivalent consumption units and quarter at 1992 prices. The percentage of home ownership does
not distinguish whether a household has any outstanding debt.
that pensioners usually have a much lower outstanding debt than workers.
I define nine categories of expenditure: (1) food and non-alcoholic beverages; (2) shelter,
which includes utilities and household services; (3) apparel and footwear; (4) transportation
(public and private), vehicles, and communications; (5) leisure, which includes entertainment,
meals away from home and hotels; (6) non-durables, which include all non-durable goods
and services in (1)-(5), plus expenditure in tobacco and alcohol, education and other personal
services (7) homeware, furnishings and fittings, including durables for the personal care; (8)
durables, which include vehicles, therapeutic material, leisure durable goods, furnishings and
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13In practice, this implies deleting 5,234 observations (2.8% of the original sample).
Another concern relates to the zero expenditure records. The nature of observed zeros de-
pends on the category and, among others, might result from non-participation, infrequency of
purchases, or a corner solution. The estimation method assumes there is one primary source of
zeros for each category. Moreover, it is presumed a positive expenditure for the consumption
of necessities food and housing.13 Notice that as a result, total and non-durable expenditures
are also always positive. The remaining categories pile up at zero with varying intensity. First,
given the broad definition of leisure, zero records might result from a corner solution. In other
words, one could assume that if the market value for these kinds of goods and services were to be
below a reservation price, households would have spent a definite amount on leisure goods and
services. Secondly, the infrequency of purchases refers to those categories with zero records
because the survey period is too short compared to the rate of purchases. As long as goods
have some durability and there are transactions costs, consumption will occur more frequently
than purchases. The categories that might be affected by the infrequency of purchases include
durables, apparel, health, transport and furnishings, homeware and fittings. The infrequent pur-
chases could arise together with corner solutions; however, either option implicitly assumes
participation. To simplify the analysis, I exclude categories with zero records most likely be-
cause of non-participation. Precisely, I do not estimate the effect of pension-related policies on
tobacco, alcohol, health and education expenditures.14
14Another reason to disregard health expenditures is the substantial subsidies toward healthcare in Spain. As a
result, this category in the EPC accounts on average only 25.3% of the National Accounts data, and, according to
Pou and Alegre (2002), 45% in the ECPF85. These could explain the adverse effects on spending in health found
during the initial stages of estimation. Luengo-Prado and Sevilla (2013) and Labeaga and Osuna (2007) reach
similar conclusions.
other personal durables; (9) total expenditure as the sum of non-durables and durables. Table
A2 in the appendix provides more details about the classification of expenses.
The adjustment for the reference period of expenditure deserves special mention. The sur-
veys collect expenses with non-recurring purchases as the spending incurred during the last
three months before the interview. Consequently, there may be a gap between the quarter of
the meeting and the time of the expenditure. Following Pou and Alegre (2002), I reallocate
infrequent spending to the previous quarter whenever the week of interview falls within the first
three to four weeks of a quarter to correct for this gap.
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Finally, the data match relatively well the national accounts figures; this is especially so for
the ECPF85. On average, total expenditure in the ECPF85 accounts for more than 75% of
consumption in the Spanish national accounts (see Pou and Alegre, 2002). The underreporting
is stronger in the early survey though, and on average total expenditure in the EPC accounts
only for 55% of consumption in the national accounts. By categories, food expenditure is
particularly well represented in either survey and accounts on average for 88% of the national
accounts figures. Nevertheless, the discrepancies between micro and aggregate data are frequent
in some other countries (see, for example, Campos, Reggio, and Gracı´a-Pı´riz, 2013), while for
the Spanish data the underreporting is not concentrated in any particular year.
cit = b0+b1(Pit ×SSt)+b2Pit +b3Hit +
T
∑
j=2
γ jyq jt +uit (1)
15Base categories are men and no schooling/primary education.
3 Empirical design
This section presents a regression difference-in-difference model for multiple policy interven-
tions to estimate the impact of pension-related policies, an aggregate fiscal shock, on household
spending. Following Angrist and Pischke (2015), consider variants of the following specifica-
tion
An essential identifying assumption is that absent the policies, the change in pensioners and
workers expenditure would have shown common trends. Figure 3, which plots the median level
where cit refers to quarterly household expenditure in either of the nine categories described in
section 2.3. Importantly, expenditure is transformed into (real) equivalent consumption units to
account for the household size. Pit is a dummy variable indicating whether a household head is
a pensioner, and SSt represents pension-related policies measured as the (real) average pension.
The interaction term Pit ×SSt indicates pensioners’ observations at the time of a pension-related
policy, while the coefficient b1 captures the direct effects of changes in average benefits. The
time effects γ j, are the coefficients on the year-quarter dummies, yq jt , indexed with a subscript t
for quarter t and the index j to keep track of the period supplying the observations. Hit denotes a
set of household characteristics wich include age, sex and education attainment of the reference
person.15
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and workers suggests a common trend. Afterward, workers’ spending shows a marked down-
ward trend compared to the pensioners’ reasonably constant level of consumption. Thus, one
could argue that the introduction of a new welfare system and pension-related policies helped to
maintain the consumption level of pensioners.16 Over time, because treatment effects emerge
gradually, it is more difficult to distinguish so clearly the impact on spending of the multiple
and continuous changes in public pensions.
Another concern is that pension-related policies may not be exogenous if policymakers time
policies to economic developments in the short-run. The identification strategy uses the new
narrative series as an instrument. The first stage takes the form
of expenditure for pensioners and workers, provides graphical evidence in support of this as-
sumption. The data for this period comes from the early survey corresponding to 1977-83, the
EPC. A reference line indicates the starting date of the multiple policies which have affected
pensioners spending. Before 1979, the evolution of the median total expenditure of pensioners
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Notes: 5-quarters centered moving average. The vertical line indicates the Constitution of December 1978.
Figure 3: Median Total Expenditure at 1992 Prices for Pensioners and Workers
16Several studies on the income and consumption distribution in Spain found that the development of the wel-
fare system contributed significantly to the reduction of inequality during the transition to democracy. See, for
example, Labeaga and Osuna (2007), Alcaide (2000), Calonge and Manresa (1997), or Bel (1997).
SSt = π0+π2t+π1NVt + vt (2)
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For τ in (0,1), the linear equation (1) implies that the conditional τ-quantile function of
household expenditure takes the form Qτ(cit |Xit) = X ′itβτ , with Xit = (Pit ,SSt ,Hit ,YQt), and
YQt summarizes the year-quarter dummies.17 When latent expenditure is left-censored at zero,
where F(x) = Prob(X ≤ x) defines the cumulative distribution function of X . Like the distribution function, the
quantile function provides a complete characterization of the random variable X .
17For τ in (0,1), the τth quantile of any real valued random variable X is that x that splits the data into proportions
τ below and (1− τ) above. Formally, the τth quantile of X can be expressed as
Qτ(X) = inf{x : F(x)≥ τ}
where the narrative series NVt of pension-related policies is used as a source of exogenous
variation in public pensions (see section 2.2) and a linear time trend is included to control for
deterministic time effects. The estimation procedure takes the control function approach of Lee
(2007), which adds a flexible real-valued function of vˆt as an additional explanatory variable
to the linear equation (1) to retrieve the causal effect of pension-related policies on expendi-
ture. The first stage can be estimated using least squares regression under the assumption that
E[v|NV ] = 0.
Regarding the estimation method, quantile regression is more robust to extreme values than
estimates of the conditional mean, which is particularly relevant given the skewness in the
distribution of household expenditure. In this sense, household level data and disaggregated
expenditure categories often imply zero expenditure records. The impact of zero records might
be attenuated defining broad categories; however, some categories like durables will still pile
up at zero. Other estimates usually found in the literature instead estimate the conditional mean
response of household expenditure to income changes. Compared to methods based on distribu-
tional assumptions to obtain either a likelihood function or an appropriate censored conditional
mean, censored quantile regression is not sensitive to misspecification of the error distribution.
Nonetheless, censored quantile regression implicitly restricts that the same stochastic process
determines consumption and purchases. Relaxing this assumption usually implies to model a
purchase probability dependent on household characteristics. It is not straightforward though,
what observables one could exclude from the consumption decision and at the same time deter-
mine the purchases policy. At the same time, given a dependency of the purchases probabilities
on household characteristics, when controlling for individual characteristics in the regressions,
we are also partly controlling for the effects of infrequent purchases.
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we observe the maximum between zero and the right-hand-side of equation (1). Then, exploit-
ing the equivariance of quantiles with respect to monotonic transformations, the conditional
τ-quantile function of household expenditure takes the form Qτ(cit |Xit) = max{0,X ′itβτ}.
To complete the model, assume that QU |SS,NV (τ|ss,nv) = QU |NV,V (τ|nv,v) = QU |V (τ|v) =
λ (v). The first equality uses the relationship involved in the first satge, while the second hinges
on the independence of the error term (u) and the instrument (NV ), conditional on the variation
in pensions not explained by the instrument that is captured by the residual of the first stage (v).
Under this assumption, b1(τ) can be estimated fitting linear quantile regressions of expenditure
on the covariates and λ (vˆ), which represents a flexible real-valued function of the fitted residuals
from the first stage. The procedure can also be implemented with censored data (Chernozhukov,
Fernandez-Val and Kowalski, 2015).18
Finally, the (censored) quantile regression estimator is consistent when the data are depen-
dent, as might be the case with repeated observations of expenditure taken on the same house-
hold (see, for example, Chen, Wei and Parzen 2003; Abrevaya and Dahl 2008). However, the
standard asymptotic-variance formula or standard bootstrap methods to compute the estimators’
standard errors are invalid. Instead, one could estimate clustered standard errors following the
formulas of Machado, Santos Silva and Wei (2016). An alternative option would be to use the
bootstrap method suggested by Abrevaya and Dahl (2008). Appendix A5 does a simple simu-
lation exercise to compare the efficiency of both methods. The simulation implies similar con-
fidence intervals for either method, but bootstrapped standard errors are unfeasible in practice.
18The user-written CQIV Stata command implements these methods of estimation. It is available at
http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocode:s457478.
The bootstrap method is too time-consuming for the current application, which involves a con-
siderable number of observations and includes numerous covariates in the regressions. Given
the inclusion of aggregate variables in the regressions for household level data, one also needs
to take into account the correlation among different households subject to the same macroeco-
nomic shock in any given quarter. Petersen (2009), Thompson (2011) or Cameron et al. (2011)
suggest a relatively simple procedure to compute two-way clustered standard errors.
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spending
As the starting point, I provide evidence of a significant and robust impact of unexpected
changes in public pensions on net recipients’ (pensioners) spending. This section focuses on
the effects on spending at the median for different categories of expenditure, while section 4.1
presents a battery of robustness checks. Section 5 will shed light over the results looking into
the effects at other points in the distribution of spending, as well as classifying pensioners by
their income and wealth.
Table 3 reports the first-round effects of pension-related policies on different categories of
household expenditure. The estimates represent the pesetas-change in the level of spending
caused by a unit increase in the average pension. The standard errors reported in parenthesis are
clustered by household and quarter. Column (1) reports the baseline estimates from (censored)
median regressions. For brevity, the first stage results are omitted; however, it is crucial to
verify that the first stage has sufficient predictive power. For example, the R-squared is 0.80
and the F-statistic for the weak instrument’s test on the narrative series 11.52. Using only the
early survey corresponding to 1977q2-1983q4, the R-squared reduces to 0.01, but the F-statistic
remains slightly above three.
4 The direct effects of pension-related policies on household
Benefits increases have a positive and statistically significant effect at the median on the
majority of expenditures. The first line of the table presents the estimates for total expenditure.
Every unit increase in average benefits causes total expenditure to raise about 0.8 pesetas. The
estimated impact is close to one within the normal-based 95 percent confidence interval [0.51,
1.03]. Romer and Romer (2016) also find that permanent benefit increases in the US have a
roughly one-for-one effect on consumer spending in the month the larger checks arrive.
The effects on total expenditure seem to be dominated by non-durables (second line), with
a marginal effect for non-durables of about 0.6 pesetas and corresponding normal-based 95
percent confidence level interval [0.40, 0.78]. This dominance of non-durables though might
only reflect that non-durables represent on average 80% of total expenditure. In contrast, the
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Notes: Change in the level of spending caused by a unit increase in the average pension. Column (2) reports
least squares estimates; column (3) reports resuts from a fixed effects regression; Columns (1) and (4) use median
regression. Estimation sample from 1977q2 to 1997q1; estimates reported in column (4) use the early survey
corresponding to 1977q2-1983q4. All regressions include time effects and controls for households characteristics.
Robust standard errors clustered by household and time in parenthesis. Minimum number of observations across
regressions by type of expenditure.
Table 3: The Effects of Pension-Related Policies on Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total 0.770 0.914 0.352 0.338
(0.132) (0.174) (0.353) (0.229)
Non-durables 0.590 0.668 0.184 0.131
(0.097) (0.128) (0.189) (0.197)
Durables 0.095 0.246 0.168 0.339
(0.043) (0.067) (0.281) (0.111)
Food 0.284 0.312 0.067 0.371
(0.042) (0.054) (0.103) (0.139)
Shelter 0.397 0.608 -0.120 0.073
(0.033) (0.064) (0.130) (0.03)
Leisure -0.198 -0.192 0.147 -0.016
(0.017) (0.035) (0.079) (0.015)
Apparel 0.085 0.100 0.051 0.231
(0.022) (0.024) (0.114) (0.043)
Furnishings 0.014 0.108 0.073 0.051
(0.007) (0.024) (0.101) (0.014)
Transport -0.148 -0.068 0.113 -0.039
(0.016) (0.041) (0.163) (0.015)
Estimator LAD-DD OLS-DD FD LAD-DD
Observations 130,623 134,665 108,057 25,106
low level of spending in durables at the median yields a much lower impact between 0.01 and
0.18 pesetas (third line).
Lines 4 and 5 show that spending on the necessities food and shelter also increase signifi-
cantly, respectively, 0.28 pesetas and 0.40 pesetas. These results are consistent with the findings
of Stephens (2003). Stephens (2003) exploits the randomization of households in the Consumer
Expenditure Surveys Diary to estimate changes in daily household consumption around the ar-
rival date of social security checks. He finds an increase in the amount and probability of
spending on non-durables and food. Notably, he finds that daily non-durable expenditures in-
crease by $1.40 during the immediate days after receipt of the checks, which is in line with my
estimates. However, compared to Stephens (2003), my coefficients are generally lower due to
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pensioners cut leisure expenditure. For one, assuming leisure is a normal good, increases in
income should translate into higher spending. Second, Sthephens (2003) finds an increase in
the spending amount of instantaneous forms of leisure around the arrival date of social security
checks. Third, estimates for the dependent variable in logs show that benefits increases trigger
a positive response of leisure expenditure. Precisely, an increase of 100 pesetas in the average
pension causes a rise of 0.01 percent in leisure expenditures.19 Thus, the negative sign might in-
using quarterly data instead of daily. On the other hand, regarding other categories of durable
expenditure, spending on apparel increases roughly by 0.1 pesetas (line 7), while line 8 shows
an insignificant effect of benefit increases on furnishings at the median.
The negative coefficient for spending on leisure reported in line 6 requires further expla-
nations. Although the negative impact presents a puzzle, it does not necessarily mean that
19Estimates for other expenditures in logs imply similar effects in terms of the underlying level of expenditure.
dicate that while both groups increase their spending on leisure, workers increase their spending
more than pensioners. The lower level of pensioners’ expenditure compared to workers leads to
a positive difference in the corresponding effects in percentage-terms. Similar arguments apply
to the puzzling negative coefficients for transport expenditures (line 9).
However, the question remains why workers might increase their spending relatively more.
One possibility could be that regressions for spending on leisure or transport do not control
well for spillover effects. Estimates in Table 5 point to regional differences in spending on
leisure. However, estimates in Table 4 prove to be robust to the inclusion of different controls
for regional effects. Another possibility could be spillover effects due to older people giving
money to their children (either inter-vivos or as a bequest), albeit this cannot be tested with the
current data. Finally, the heavy subsidies for retirees to use public transport in Spain might have
played a role in the negative effects on transportation. Nevertheless, the spillover effects and
other factors imply a negative bias such that one can consider the coefficients as a lower bound
estimate.
A 100 pesetas rise in average benefits increases 0.07 percent total expenditure, which, given a median expenditure
of pensioners of 170,386 pesetas, implies a 95 percent normal-based confidence interval between 0.89 to 1.41
pesetas in terms of the underlying level of expenditure. Non-durables rise 0.06 percent, or between 0.61 and 1.01
pesetas; durables would also increase 0.06 percent, or between 0.05 and 0.15 pesetas in terms of the underlying
level of expenditure.
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Next, we could compare our baseline estimates with the results from alternative specifica-
tions. First, using only the early survey corresponding to 1977q2-1983q4 yields very imprecise
estimates (column 4). The large standard errors could be due to a much smaller estimation sam-
ple compared to the baseline; idiosyncrasies of the alternative sample could also have played
a role. Secondly, least squares estimates allow for comparability with the literature. The least
squares estimates (column 2) resemble their median regression counterparts (column 1) es-
pecially for the categories mainly made of non-durable expenditures. Overall, least squares
estimates tend to be larger than their median regression counterparts. Finally, an alternative
could be to estimate the model in first differences to deal with the fixed effects (column 3). First
This section presents additional checks for the identifying assumptions discussed in section 3,
including further exploration of the potential endogeneity of the narrative series, or the potential
bias in the estimates due to other contemporary policies. I also investigate the existence of
regional effects and local spillovers, as well as the possibility of cohort effects. The section
ends with other standard checks.
Insofar that macroeconomic developments might affect inflation and the adjustments of pen-
sions, there might exist endogeneity concerns about the new narrative series. In response to
these concerns, the quantification of all exogenous pension-related policies has been against the
benchmark of annual increases in pensions equal to the inflation rate (see section 2.2). The
narrative analysis also excludes any pension-related policies with a clear countercyclical moti-
vation. Moreover, the results in Table 1 reject that macro variables including output, inflation,
and the short-term interest rate predict the timing or size of exogenous pension-related policies.
Despite these actions, including inflation adjustments among the pension-related policies could
still introduce a positive bias in the estimates. For example, the estimation sample includes a
period of demand-side based economic growth driven by the entry of Spain into the European
differences estimates are in general very imprecisely estimated. Here, it is worth noticing the
impact that a limited variation of the covariates across households (aggregate policies and time
dummies) could have for identification in any fixed effects specification.
4.1 Robustness checks
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Community. This model tends to generate higher inflation and implies a positive relationship
between inflation, consumption, and benefit increases. With these considerations in mind, col-
umn (2) of Table 4 reports the results of regressions that exclude inflation adjustments from the
narrative variable. Column (1) reproduces the baseline estimates for convenience again. Com-
paring (1) and (2), the estimates across categories of expenditure are robust to the exclusion of
20For brevity, Table 4 omits estimates excluding other categories of pension-related policies. Nonetheless,
the results do not seem driven by any particular type of policy or motivation. Excluding ideological policies
yields a coefficient of 0.782 and associated two-way clustered standard error of 0.131. Excluding reforms yields a
coefficient of 0.779 with a standard error of 0.132.
21Using from one or two lags, instead of three, implied very similar dynamics. All the specifications yielded a
statistically insignificant coefficient for the lead.
Notes: The plot reports the results for a median regression of total expenditure on the contemporaneous value,
a lead, and three lags of benefits, household characteristics and time effects. The vertical lines report 95 percet
confidece intervals. Sample 1977q2 to 1997q1; observations 40,498.
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Figure 4: The Dynamics of Benefit Increases
these policies. 20
Given that the sample includes multiple periods, we could modify the specification to test the
Granger causality of the policy changes (Autor, 2003). If the policy changes cause spending and
not vice versa, introducing dummies for future policy changes in the specification (1) should
not matter. At the same time, we can introduce lagged effects to investigate how causal effects
evolve. The estimated leads and lags, running from one quarter ahead to three quarters behind,
are plotted in Figure 4. The estimates show no significant effects the quarter before pension-
related policies take place, a maximum effect upon impact, and gradually decaying effects in the
following quarters.21 This pattern seems consistent with a causal interpretation of the results.
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Regarding other contemporaneous policies, little evidence indicates that the evolution of
public pensions influenced tax policy over the estimation period. To begin with, the narrative
exercise of Gil et al. (2017) finds but one simultaneous increase in Social Security benefits
and contributions, that is an increase of 0.5% in social contributions the first quarter of 1993.
However, the most substantial increase in social benefits attributable to the 1992-93 economic
crisis was due to unemployment benefits rather than public pensions. Moreover, Gil et al. (2017)
argue that the tax reforms of 1991 and later extensions also responded to European directives
and past reforms. Other tax policies in 1992 and 1995 decreased revenues. Lacking a series of
exogenous tax changes that go sufficiently back in time, column (3) of Table 4 includes as an
additional regressor the previous year (real) average monthly contribution for social insurance.22
Reassuringly, the estimates appear robust to including this additional covariate.
22The real average monthly contribution for social insurance refers to total contributions for social insurance
divided by the number of insured employees and the CPI base year 1992. The annual average contribution is
divided by 14 to obtain a monthly equivalent. Sources: Table I.10 and I.28 from the Annex to the Economic and
Financial Report of the Social Security budget of 2016; Table 12.31 from Carreras and Tafunell (2005); Spanish
Statistics Office.
Next, I explore the role of regional spillovers. The estimates could suffer from omitted
variables bias if the effects of pension-related policies on consumption depend on the share
of pensioners living in each region.23 One could control for these possible regional spillovers
23The one-time surveys of 1980-81 and 1990-91 show an unequal distribution of pensioners over the Span-
ish territory. For example, in regions such as Madrid, Ca´diz or Navarra less than 20% of the population were
pensioners. In contrast, pensioners represent more than 35% of the population in the regions of Ourense or Soria.
Time effects capture other sources of variation in household expenditure induced by other
economic shocks. Importantly, time effects will capture the general equilibrium forces that de-
termine the ultimate impact on consumer spending and output caused by any initial benefits
increase. In a pay-as-you-go system for old-age-pensions, an increase in pensioners’ dispos-
able income comes at the expense of working-age individuals. Then, if benefit increases hurt
working-age individuals through expected higher taxes, estimates of b1 could be positively bi-
ased. On the other hand, if more generous pensions have a positive effect on working-age in-
dividuals through an increase in national income or expected pension wealth, then estimates of
b1 could be seen as a lower bound. The latter raises fewer concerns, while the former demands
robustness checks to test for this possibility. In this line of reasoning, the possible existence of
regional spillovers could also compromise the ability of the time dummies to control for general
equilibrium effects.
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24See “Cuadro 1: ECPF. Distribucio´n espacial del nu´mero de secciones y viviendas muestrales” in INE (1988).
According to Lo´pez (1993), every Spanish region includes three “zones” (except Madrid and Catalunya with four
zones, and Ceuta-Melilla with one zone) concerning the size of township based on Census information. The
factors represent the ratio between population size and sample size for each “zone”. In total, there are 51 different
grossing-up factors each quarter.
Notes: Change in the level of spending caused by a unit increase in the average pension. Column (1) reproduces
the baseline estimates; Column (2) excludes exogenous pension-related policies due to indexation. Column (3)
includes the previous year average social insurance contributions to control for simultaneous tax policies. Column
(4) includes the share of pensioners in the population of each region. All regressions control for time effects and
household characteristics. Robust standard errors clustered by household and time in parenthesis. The minimum
number of observations across regressions.
including an additional covariate that represents the share of pensioners in each region. Al-
though the ECPF85 does not report information about the regions where households live, one
could use other information included in the survey to construct such a variable. The procedure
assigns the grossing-up factors to the different regions using the information we have of the
Table 4: Robustness Checks - Effects of Pension-related Policies on Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total 0.770 0.751 0.668 0.729
(0.132) (0.133) (0.204) (0.13)
Non-durables 0.590 0.580 0.552 0.551
(0.097) (0.097) (0.153) (0.097)
Durables 0.095 0.087 0.123 0.089
(0.043) (0.045) (0.071) (0.041)
Food 0.284 0.271 0.314 0.279
(0.042) (0.042) (0.068) (0.044)
Shelter 0.397 0.394 0.381 0.395
(0.033) (0.034) (0.047) (0.034)
Leisure -0.198 -0.193 -0.251 -0.207
(0.017) (0.018) (0.031) (0.018)
Apparel 0.085 0.079 0.070 0.085
(0.022) (0.023) (0.037) (0.022)
Furnishings 0.014 0.015 -0.001 0.013
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
Transport -0.148 -0.145 -0.123 -0.161
(0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.015)
Observations 130,623 130,616 130,615 130,622
Controls Baseline No
Indexation
Tax Policy Share
Pensioners
theoretical number of households by regions and “zones”.24 Column (4) of Table 4 reports es-
timates including as an additional covariate the share of pensioners in each region to capture
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1913
erwise, a significant coefficient would indicate that the share of pensioners in the population
influences the impact of benefit increases on spending. Except for leisure, the implied effects
are insignificant and the standard errors large (Table 5). Regarding leisure expenditure, the es-
timates suggest that regions with a higher presence of pensioners tend to have higher levels of
spending in leisure. However, estimates for the effects on leisure reported in Table 4 are close
to the baseline. Overall, the results do not support different effects between regions.
On a related note, it is a possibility that cohort effects might drive the estimates. To ex-
plore the role of cohort effects pensioners were subdivided depending on their date of birth.
Specifically, historical and social events occurred between the 1980s and 1930s suggest three
subgroups: pensioners born before 1920s, born in the 1920s, and born in the 1930s. Impor-
tantly, this grouping guarantees an even split of households. Then, we can fit a regression that
the potential regional spillover effects. Again, the alternative coefficients are very close to the
baseline estimates in column (1).25
An alternative test of the influence of regional spillovers would be to run regressions for
semi-aggregated data at the regional level. Consider the following linear relationship of semi-
aggregated expenditure on the explanatory variables
Cgt = b0+b1× (πg×SSt)+
S
∑
s=2
αsGsg+
T
∑
j=2
γ jyq jt +ugt (3)
where Cgt represents the average (real) expenditure of region g, and πg represents the annual
fraction of pensioners in each region g as a measure of the exposure of each group to the policies.
In other words, we adjust the aggregate spending on public pensions by the importance of
pensioners in each region. The regressions control for time effects and every region but one
gets its own dummy variable, Gsg, indexed with a subscript g for region g and an index s to keep
track of the group supplying the observations.
If regional spillovers were not an issue, we should find non-significant coefficients. Oth-
25Alternatively, one could introduce dummies for each of the 18 regions that constitute Spain, or an indicator
for whether households live in a rural, intermediate, or urban habitat (urban habitats correspond to townships with
more than 50,000 inhabitants and the capitals of province; intermediate includes townships with 10,000-50,000
inhabitants; rural habitats include townships with less than 10,000 inhabitants). It is reassuring that the implied
effects are not statistically different from the baseline at the standard levels of confidence.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1913
aggregates observations by cohort and replaces Pit with a set of cohort dummies. Notice that
the sum of interactions between cohort dummies and aggregate expenditure on public pensions
simplifies to 1[≤ 1930s]×SSt , where 1[≤ 1930s] is an indicator function that takes the value of
one for all cohorts formed by pensioners, and zero otherwise. The results reported in Table 6
Table 5: Regional Differences in the Effects of Pension-Related Policies on Spending
Total Non-durables Durables
πsg× SˆSt -0.015 -0.016 -0.024
(0.253) (0.143) (0.064)
Food Shelter Leisure
πsg× SˆSt 0.009 0.018 0.047
(0.066) (0.082) (0.020)
Apparel Furnishings Tranport
πsg× SˆSt -0.034 0.011 0.011
(0.031) (0.036) (0.068)
Notes: Median regression estimates for the change in average regional expenditure caused by a unit increase in the
average pension. A shorthand for the dependent variable stated on top. Details about the specification given in the
text. Regressions include controls for time effects and regional dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered
by region. 1,341 observations; sample 1977q2 to 1997q1.
disagree with different effects between cohorts. For each cohort, and on average, the coefficients
are not statistically significant, with substantial standard errors.
Finally, it is also relevant to check the definition of the control group. To this end, one can
fit alternative regressions that set different age thresholds for ‘workers.’ Figure 5 plots the es-
timated MPC of total expenditure for the alternative control groups, along with the 95 percent
confidence level bands. The implied marginal effects out of a unit increase in the average pen-
sion decrease the higher the age threshold. Up to 39 years old the implied effect is the highest,
Table 6: The Effects of Pension-Related Policies on Total Expenditure by Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
≤ 1920s 1920-29 1930-39 ≤ 1930s
bs -0.194 -0.171 0.432 -0.013
(0.268) (0.302) (0.256) (0.418)
Households 3,963 4,089 4,411 12,463
Notes: Median regression estimates for the chnage in average total expenditure by cohort caused by a unit increase
in average benefits. A shorthand for the cohort is stated on top. The regressions control for cohorts and time
effects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by cohort. Sample 1977q2 to 1997q1. Number of observations
429.
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averaging 1.5 pesetas, although the estimation samples also involve a much lower number of
observations. Between 40-49 years old the average response is roughly 1.2 pesetas. Including
worker 50 and older the average response is roughly 0.8 pesetas.
The choice of a high age threshold for the control group primarily seeks to guarantee a
correct control of general equilibrium effects. A condition for time effects to capture general
equilibrium forces is that pensioners and non-pensioners are affected similarly by an increase in
aggregate income. The lower the age threshold set for the control group, the more unlikely this
assumption will be satisfied. Standard consumption theory predicts that ‘young workers’ will
respond less to changes in expected retirement income than ‘older workers’ (see, for example,
Attanasio and Rohwedder, 2003). Intuitively, an individual that is 30 years old by the time they
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Figure 5: Marginal Effects on Total Spending for Alternative Control Groups
report to either consumption survey should, on average, discount 35 years any expected change
in their future retirement income! At the same time, remember that ‘older workers’ do not
collect any money from the pension-related policies. The control group includes households
with neither their reference person nor any other family member earning benefits. Hausman
(2016), Parker et al. (2013) or Stephens (2003) used similar strategies for constructing their
treatment and control groups.
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While estimates of the effects at the median are informative, one could also expect to find
different effects for high and low-level spenders. This paper suggests fitting quantile regressions
at other points of the conditional distribution of expenditures to investigate the different effects
5 The heterogeneous effects of pension-related policies
5.1 Other quantiles of expenditure
26Two-way clustered standard errors by household and quarter.
of pension-related policies on spending. Figure 6 shows the 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9th quantile
estimates for total expenditure, and the sub-aggregated categories of non-durables, food and
shelter. Censored quantile regression estimates are reported for the remaining categories. The
estimates report the pesetas-change in the level of spending caused by a unit increase in the
average pension. Notice that the median estimates correspond to the reported coefficients in
Table (3). The plots also report normal based 95 percent confidence intervals.26
The top row of Figure (6) shows the estimates for total expenditure and the broad categories
of non-durables, and durables. The plots show that benefit increases affect consumption-rich
pensioners the most, especially regarding durables. The left panel on the top shows that pen-
sioners at the 0.9th quantile increase their spending on durables almost ten times more than
those at the 0.3th quantile, 0.47 pesetas compared to 0.05 pesetas respectively. In a fairer com-
parison with observations further away from the censoring point, pensioners at the top quantile
still increase their spending on durables five times more than those at the median (0.09 pese-
tas). Subcategories of durables such as apparel (right panel in the middle row) and furnishings,
furniture and fittings (middle panel at the bottom) also show a rising effect with the level of
expenditure. These patterns are in line with Misra and Surico (2014), who find a positive corre-
lation between the tax rebates of 2001 and 2008 in the US and spending. Although the authors
did not estimate the effects of the US tax rebates on a broad category of durables, they find
similar upward patterns for spending on apparel and transportation. Regarding this last cate-
gory, my results are entirely different from those of Misra and Surico (2014). In this regard,
the discussion in Section 4 on the adverse effects on transportation extends to all quantiles of
transport expenditure with a definite level of spending (right panel at the bottom).
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Figure 6: Effects of Pension-related Policies by Quantile of Household Expenditure
Notes: The dashed lines with marker report quantile regression estimates. Censored quantile regression estimates
for durables, leisure, apparel, furnishings, and transport. Details on the specification can be found in the text. All
the regressions control for time effects and household characteristics. Sample 1977q2 to 1997q1. Observations
130,624. The vertical lines reports 95 percent confidence intervals.
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At the same time, the left panel on the middle row shows that pension-related policies also
have substantial effects on the consumption-poor spending on food. For every unit increase in
the average pension, pensioners at the bottom of the distribution of food expenditure increased
their spending by almost 0.3 pesetas. Although the effects appear stable across quantiles of
expenditure, the insignificant coefficient at the 0.9th quantile points to a decreasing effect of
pension-related policies with the level of food expenditure. Regarding shelter, the other category
that can be considered a necessity, the increasing effects with the level of expenditure (middle
panel in the middle row) contrast with the little evidence of heterogeneity in utilities, household
operations and housing found by Misra and Surico (2014).
To investigate whether pension-related policies affect similarly households across the distribu-
tion of income and wealth one could estimate the different effects by wealth level. However,
5.2 The role of wealth
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27For evidence using other surveys see, for example, Dı´az-Gime´nez and co-authors (1997), Masier and Vil-
lanueva (2011), or Banco de Espan˜a (2004). Bover and co-authors (2005) offer a good international comparison
between the balance sheets of households in Spain, the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Table 7: Characteristics of Pensioners, Grouping According to their Wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Owners Non-
Owners
Wealthy Income-
poor
Wealthy
Hand-to-
Mouth
Hand-to-
Mouth
Households 7,186 1,380 4,373 4,193 2,833 1,360
Observations 38,085 7,030 22,419 22,696 15,754 6,942
Home owner 98.05% 0.0% 97.96% 67.76% 97.62% 0.0%
Other real estate 14.86% 0.0% 21.10% 4.09% 5.90% 0.0%
Age 71 72 70 72 71 72
Spouse’s age 66 66 65 67 67 66
Woman 26.46% 41.68% 24.72% 32.90% 28.98% 41.80%
No/Primary education 91.39% 89.74% 86.85% 95.37% 97.69% 90.10%
Total expenditure (pts) 176,108 142,323 209,626 137,457 135,736 141,733
Non-durables (pts) 147,625 117,853 176,206 114,947 113,988 117,197
Durables (pts) 18,651 16,572 22,069 15,123 14,608 16,408
Food (pts) 54,706 55,590 56,785 52,536 51,252 55,540
Notes: ‘Owner’ refers to pensioners that own real estate. ‘Wealthy’ (‘income-poor’) refers to pensioners with a
level of capital income above (below) the median. ‘Wealthy hand-to-mouth’ refers to pensioners with a level of
capital income below the median but owners of real estate; ‘Hand-to-mouth’ refers to pensioners with a level of
capital income below the median and without real estate. Predicted probabilities have been estimated for obser-
vations without information on household income. Age, sex and education attainement of the reference person.
Median expenditures per equivalent consumption units and quarter at 1992 prices.
the surveys do not contain direct information on the wealth of households. A second best could
be to group pensioners depending on their real estate. Housing constitutes a significant compo-
nent of households’ wealth, particularly relevant in Spain and for older individuals.27 Columns
(1) and (2) in Table 7 compare the characteristics of pensioners that own some real estate with
those that do not. ‘Owners’ refers to pensioners that own their primary residence or any other
real estate such as a second home, parking garages, or office buildings. Both groups have ref-
erence persons with similar average age and educational attainment. Even so, non-owners are
more likely to be a woman, report lower levels of expenditure, and spend relatively more on
non-durables and food. Here, notice that the unequal distribution of pensioners between the
two groups constitutes a caveat of this classification, with more than 80 percent of pensioners
owning some housing.
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Figure 7 shows the different effects that a unit increase in the average pension has on pen-
sioners grouped according to their real estate. For brevity, the figures report estimates for total
Notes: The black lines report the effects on owners of real estate of a unit increase in the average pension. The
light gray lines report the effects on pensioners that do not own any real estate. (Censored) Quantile regression
estimates for (durables) total expenditure, non-durables, and food. Regressions include controls for household
characteristics and time effects. The thin lines and shaded area report normal based 95 confidence level intervals.
Estimation sample 1977q2 to 1997q1. Observations 130,625.
Figure 7: Effects on Spending by Quantile of Household Expenditure, Grouping of Pensioners
Based on their Real Estate
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expenditure, as well as spending on non-durables and durables. The figures also report estimates
for food expenditure as a representative of spending in necessities and strictly non-durables.
This selection completely summarizes the effects of pension-related policies on spending. The
plots show that the effects are the strongest on ‘owners’ (black lines). Regarding durables
(bottom-left panel), while both groups of pensioners are similarly affected, the estimates are
not statistically significant for ‘non-owners’ (light gray lines). Nevertheless, both groups are
similarly affected when it comes to spending on food.
Alternatively, we could use capital income earnings as a proxy for wealth. Everything else
equal, the higher the level of capital income, the more likely a household holds high levels
of assets and wealth. However, the EPC does not report information on household income
either. Even so, we can use the information reported in the ECPF85 about household income
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28There was little difference with the predicted probabilities form a logit model. A simple linear probability
model produced some predicted probabilities that were either negative or exceeding one.
Pr[yi = 1|X ] =Φ(X ′itβ ) (4)
The estimation sample includes all households of the ECPF85 whose reference person is a
pensioner, which provides 37,886 observations, sufficient to correctly estimate the probability
that a household has a level of capital income above of the median as a function of household
characteristics. For example, the pseudo-R2 was 0.23, and the histograms included in Appendix
A4 show similar profiles of the empirical distribution of probabilities for either survey. Given
the predicted probabilities, pensioners in the EPC were assigned a level of capital income above
the median (y= 1) if their predicted probabilities were in the upper half of the distribution. This
classification implies similar characteristics for pensioners with y = 1 in both surveys (Table
A3) and suggests that the procedure yields reasonable estimates.
Given the probabilities, we can now make an alternative classification of pensioners based
on their capital income as a proxy for their wealth. ‘Wealthy’ pensioners either reported an
average level of capital income above the median or their estimated probability is in the upper
half of the distribution. On the other hand, ‘income-poor’ pensioners either reported capital
income below the median or had too low predicted probabilities. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 7
show an even split of pensioners between both groups. Compared to ‘income-poor’ pensioners,
‘wealthy’ pensioners are on average younger, more educated, less likely to be a woman, own
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal. The choice of a
probit model has the obvious advantage of bounding the estimated probabilities between zero
and one.28 The dependent variable takes the value of one if a household average capital income
is above the median, and zero otherwise. The regressors X include a polynomial of second
order for the age of the reference person, a dummy for whether they are a woman or have
no/primary education, the household size in equivalent consumption units, dummies for whether
the household owns any real estate, and dummies for the region of residence.
to estimate the probability that households have a level of capital income above the median on
individual characteristics common to both surveys. Specifically, one could estimate the probit
model
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more real estate and report higher levels of expenditure. Regarding items of expenditure, while
both groups spend about the same share on durables, ‘income-poor’ pensioners spend more on
food.
Figure 8 indicates that, under this alternative classification, the effects on the wealthy remain
the strongest for total expenditure and non-durables, while both groups show similar responses
when it comes to durables and food. Regarding this last category though, highlights the dif-
ference at the top quantiles of the distribution: not only do wealthy pensioners spend a lower
share of the benefits increases on food, but the effects also become insignificant. The results
are consistent with the findings of Giavazzi and McMahon (2013) on the effects of govern-
ment spending policies on household spending. Misra and Surico (2014) also found that the
Notes: The black lines report the response of pensioners with capital income above the median to a unit increase in
the average pension. The light gray lines report the response of pensioners with capital income below the median.
The thin lines and shaded areas report normal-based 95 confidence level intervals. (Censored) Quantile regression
estimates for (durables) total expenditure, non-durables, and food. Regressions include controls for household
characteristics and time effects. Estimation sample 1977q2 to 1997q1; Observations 130,621.
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Figure 8: Effects on Spending by Quantile of Household Expenditure, Grouping of Pensioners
Based on their Capital Income
income-rich had the most significant response out of the 2001 and 2008 tax rebates in the US.
On the other hand, the results contrast with the findings of Parker et al. (2013) in their series
of studies of the US tax rebates. Their estimates suggest the most significant spending response
for the low-income, old age, and borrowing constrained households. Even so, their estimates
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rents.29 On the other hand, real estate usually constitutes the most important illiquid asset for
households. Based on this observations, Kaplan and Violante (2014) proposed a quantitative
model that serves as a theoretical basis for the extensive empirical evidence that temporary
changes in income can generate high MPCs (for example, Parker et al. 2013, Misra and Surico
2014, Cloyne and Surico 2016, Jappelli and Pistaferri 2014). A vital feature of the model is that
besides hand-to-mouth households, it also features what has been called wealthy hand-to-mouth
households. These are households that hold sizable amounts of illiquid wealth, yet deviate from
the consumption behavior predicted by the permanent income hypothesis. The wealthy hand-to-
mouth act as if they are constrained, but they would not appear constrained from the viewpoint
of a classification based on net worth.
Ideally, one would like to have four groups of pensioners according to whether they have a
high or low level of capital income and own or not any real estate. Because only 20 households
had high capital income and no real estate, I assigned pensioners to the group previously called
‘wealthy’ whenever they have an average capital income above the median. Otherwise, I set
two groups for those pensioners with no or little capital income. Those that own real estate will
be called the ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth,’ while those that do not own any real estate will be called
the ‘hand-to-mouth.’ The latter fits well the stereotype of liquidity constrained households in
theoretical models (Cloyne and Surico, 2016). Moreover, one might worry that the number of
debtors in either group might influence the results. However, pensioners usually have low rates
of outstanding debts, as reported by the one-time surveys of 1980/81 and 1990/91.
A classification of pensioners based either on their real estate or their capital income only
covers net worth partly. In turn, each type of wealth covers assets with different liquidity.
On the one hand, capital income includes liquid returns in the form of interests, dividends, or
29Capital income in the ECPF85 defined as interest income from current accounts, savings accounts, and other
accounts; Dividends and distribution of profits; Bond yields, bills of exchange and other disposals of equity; In-
come that companies pay to the members of their boards of directors, provided that they are not salaried employees;
Income from temporary or life annuities; Yields of intellectual or industrial property (if the author is not the recipi-
ent of the profits, since in this case they will be considered as self-employment income); Rental of homes, premises
and land; Participation of the owner or the beneficial owner in the price of subletting or transfer; Leasing, rights,
business or mines.
also suggest that there are no statistical differences in the spending response between low- and
high-income groups.
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Table 7 offers a comparison between the three groups. Columns (3) and (5) compare ‘wealthy’
and ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth’ pensioners. Both groups show very similar homeownership rates,
30Standard errors clustered by household and time.
while‘wealthy’ pensioners show, on average, higher rates of other types of real estate. ‘Wealthy’
pensioners are also younger, more educated, and report higher levels of expenditure. Regarding
items of expenditure, while all groups spend about the same share on durables, ‘wealthy hand-
to-mouth’ and ‘hand-to-mouth’ pensioners (column 6) spend a larger share on food. ‘Hand-to-
mouth’ pensioners are the least numerous group, older, and more likely to be a woman.
or large medical expenses as possible explanations for the savings of the elderly. De Nardi,
French, and Jones (2010) can replicate the savings of the elderly, especially the richer ones, in
Taken all together, the estimates for the three alternative groupings indicate that the response
of wealthy pensioners is driving the results. In turn, this implies little support for the existence
of strong voluntary bequests motives to save the benefit increases. The introduction of a con-
sumption floor provided by the programs of the Social Security could have also reduced the
incentive to save against bad income shocks. This contrasts with previous work on the savings
of the elderly. For example, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) cite bequests motives, survival risk
Figure 9 shows the different effects that pension-related policies have on pensioners concern-
ing their wealth. As before, the figure plots (censored) quantile regression estimates together
with normal-based 95 percent confidence level intervals.30 Overall, Figure 9 also suggests
that the wealthy pensioners are the most affected by increases in benefits. However, the most
affected group depends on the expenditure category, which partly agrees with the negative cor-
relation between MPC and cash-on-hand found by Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014). While the
‘wealthy’ seem to be driving the results for total expenditure (top row) and non-durables (sec-
ond row), the effects on durables (third row) are very similar for the ‘wealthy’ and ‘wealthy
hand-to-mouth’ pensioners, and even slightly stronger on the latter. When it comes to food
(bottom row), all groups show similar and significant effects, with the most substantial ef-
fects again for the ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth.’ In contrast to the other two groups, the effects on
food expenditure for the ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth’ do not decline with the level of expenditure.
Moreover, to the exception of durables, the effects are more homogeneous across quantiles of
expenditure within groups.
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Notes: The dashed lines with markers report the pesetas increase in expenditure to a unit increase in the average
pension. The vertical lines report normal based 95 confidence level intervals. Definitions for the groups of pen-
sioners given in the text. (Censored) Quantile regression estimates for (durables) total expenditure, non-durables,
and food. Regressions include controls for household characteristics and time effects. Estimation sample 1977q2
to 1997q1; Observations 130,621.
the United States with a model that features these three elements. However, one should factor
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Figure 9: Effects on Spending by Quantile of Household Expenditure, Grouping of Pensioners
According to their Wealth
in the generalized tenure of real estate and the strong response of spending on durable goods
before drawing any firm conclusions on the bequests saving behavior of Spanish pensioners.
Regarding the definition of ‘wealthy,’ a simple classification in terms of net worth appears
sufficient to obtain significant heterogeneous effects of benefit increases. Thus, I find no com-
pelling evidence to support adding layers of complexity to model pensioners in macro models,
as proposed by the recent theoretical advances on heterogeneous agent models to study the ef-
fectiveness of fiscal policy (Kaplan and Violante 2014, Eggertsson and Krugman 2012). More-
over, a comparison with empiric applications that study the heterogeneous effects of tax changes
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The results imply that pension-related policies have real direct effects on household spend-
ing. First, increases in the average pension have a roughly one-for-one impact on pensioner
spending. Second, an exploration of the heterogeneous effects of benefit increases reveals the
most robust results on the wealthy pensioners, with associated high levels of expenditure, in-
come, and wealth. Moreover, given the low levels of outstanding debt owed by pensioners,
such as Cloyne and Surico (2016) or Misra and Surico (2014) points to the lower outstanding
debt of pensioners compared to working-age individuals, as the primary explanatory factor for
the divergences.
6 Concluding remarks
Finally, the results have significant policy implications. According to the latest OECD re-
port on pension systems (Pensions at a Glance 2017), recent reforms addressing the financial
sustainability of pension systems will lower pension benefits in many countries. The results
in this paper predict that such policies will result in a substantial drop in pensioners’ spend-
ing, with an associated fall in their welfare and living standards, while suggesting significant
adverse effects on the aggregate economy. However, further advances in the study of the aggre-
gate impact of transfer changes are needed to draw a firmer conclusion on the aggregate effects
of pension-related policies.
This paper estimates the impact of permanent exogenous changes in the average pension, and
aggregate fiscal policy, on household level spending. The estimation strategy exploits the de-
viation in pensioner income and expenditure relative to working-age individuals caused by the
introduction of a new welfare system at the onset of the democracy in Spain during the late
1970s. This paper presents a new narrative series of legislated pension changes in Spain corre-
sponding to 1979q1-1997q4 to deal with the endogeneity issues related to benefit increases.
the results suggest that using a simple classification concerning net worth suffices to obtain
significant heterogeneous effects out of benefit increases. Last but not least, a detailed analy-
sis of the impacts for different categories of expenditure indicates that benefit increases trigger
the wealthy pensioners to spend more on durables. At the same time, pension-related policies
targeted to the well off pensioners like improvements of the minimum pension, also affect the
spending on non-durables and necessities such as food positively.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 46 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1913
References
Abrevaya, J. and C. M. Dahl (2008). The effects of birth on birthweight: evidence from quantile estimation on
panel data. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 26:4, 379-397.
Angrist, J., and J. S. Pischke (2015). Mastering ’metrics: The path from cause to effect. Princeton University
Press.
Alcaide J. (2000). La renta nacional de Espan˜a y su distribucio´n. Serie an˜os 1898 a 1998. In “1900-2000. historia
de un esfuerzo colectivo: co´mo Espan˜a supero´ el pesimismo y la pobreza”. Ed. by Juan Velarde Fuertes, Vol. 2,
375-450.
Attanasio, O., and S. Rohwedder (2003). Pension wealth and household saving: evidence from pension reforms
in the United Kingdom. American Economic Review, 93 (5), 1499-1521.
Attanasio, O. and G. Weber (2010). Consumption and Saving: Models of intertemporal allocation and their
implications for public policy. NBER Working Paper 15756.
Autor, D. (2003). Outsourcing at will: the contribution of unjust dismissal doctrine to the growth of employment
outsourcing. Journal of Labor Economics, 21, 1-42.
Banco de Espan˜a (2004). Encuesta Financiera de la Familias (EFF): descripcio´n, me´todos y resultados prelim-
inares. Boletı´n Econo´mico, Noviembre.
Bel, G. (1997). Desigualdad social, redistribucio´n y Estado del Bienestar. Sistema: Revista de ciencias sociales,
137, 81-91.
Bover, O., C. Martı´nez-Carrascal, and P. Velilla (2005). La situacio´n patrimonial de las familias espan˜olas: Una
comparacio´n microecono´mica con Estados Unidos, Italia y el Reino Unido. Boletı´n Econo´mico Banco de Espan˜a,
April.
Calonge S. and A. Manresa (1997). Consecuencias redistributivas del estado del bienestar en Espan˜a: Un ana´lisis
empı´rico desagregado. Moneda y Crr´edito, 204.
Cameron, C., J. Gelbach, and D. Miller (2011). Robust inference with multiway clustering. Journal of Business
& Economic Statistics, 29 (2), 238-249.
Campos, R. G., I. Reggio, and D. Garcı´a-Pı´riz (2013). Micro versus macro consumption data: the cyclical prop-
erties of the consumer expenditure survey, Applied Economics, 45 (26), 3778-3785.
Carreras, A. and X. Tafunell (2010). Historia econo´mica de la Espan˜a contempora´nea (1789-2009). Barcelona:
Crı´tica, second edition.
Carreras, A. and X. Tafunell (2005). Estadı´sticas histo´ricas de Espan˜a : siglos XIX-XX. Second edition. Fun-
dacio´n BBVA.
Chen, L., L.J. Wei, and M.Parzen (2003). Quantile regression for correlated observations. Proceedings of the
Second Seattle Symposium in Biostatistics: Analysis of Correlated Data (Eds. Danyu Lin and Patrick Heagerty).
Lecture Notes in Statistics. Springer, New York.
Chernozhukov, V., I. Ferna´ndez-Val, and A. Kowalski (2015). Quantile regression with censoring and endogene-
ity. Journal of Econometrics, 186, 201-221.
Cloyne, J. (2013). Discretionary tax changes and the Macroeconomy: New narrative evidence from the United
Kingdom. American Economic Review, 103:4, 1507-1528.
Cloyne, J. and P. Surico (2014). Household debt and the dynamic effects of income tax changes. Review of
Economic Studies, 84 (1), 45-81.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 47 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1913
De Nardi, M., E. French, and J. B. Jones (2010). Why do the elderly save? The role of medical expenses. Journal
of Political Economy, 118, 39-75.
Dı´az-Gime´nez, J., V. Quadrini and J. Rı´os-Rull (1997). Dimensions of inequality: Facts on the U.S. distributions
of earnings, income and wealth. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis: Quarterly Review, 21 (2), 3-21.
Eggertsson, G. and P. Krugman (2012). Debt, deleveraging, and the liquidity trap: A Fisher-Minsky-Koo ap-
proach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127, 1469-513.
Gil, P., F. Marti, R. Morris, J.J. Pe´rez, and R. Ramos (2017). The output effects of tax changes: Narrative evidence
from Spain. Banco de Espan˜a Working Paper 1721.
Giavazzi, F., and M. McMahon (2012). The household effects of government spending. In “Fiscal Policy after
the Financial Crisis”, Eds. Alesina, A. and Giavazzi, F., University of Chicago Press.
Hausman J. K. (2016). Fiscal policy and economic recovery: The case of the 1936 veterans’ bonus. American
Economic Review, 106 (4), 1100-1143.
INE (1988) Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares an˜o 1986. Metodologı´a y resultados.
Jappelli, T., and L. Pistaferri (2014). Fiscal Policy andMPC heterogeneity. American Economic Journal: Macroe-
conomics, 6 (4), 107-136.
Kaplan, G. and, G. Violante (2014). A model of the consumption response to fiscal stimulus payments. Econo-
metrica, 82:4, 1199-1239.
Kowalski, A. (2016). Censored quantile instrumental variable estimates of the price elasticity of expenditure on
medical care. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics,34:1, 107-117.
Labeaga, J. M., and R. Osuna (2007). Expenditures at retirement by Spanish households. FEDEA Working Paper
2007-36.
Lee, S. (2007). Endogeneity in quantile regression models: A control function approach. Journal of Economet-
rics, 141, 1131-1158.
Lo´pez, A. (1993) An assessment of the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (1985-89) as a source of
information for applied research. Economics Working Paper 53, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Luengo-Prado, M. J., and A. Sevilla (2013). Time to cook: Expenditure at retirement in Spain. Economic Journal,
Royal Economic Society, 123, 764-789.
Machado, J., J.M.C. Santos Silva, and K. Wei (2016). Quantiles, corners, and the extensive margin of trade.
European Economic Review, 89, 73-84.
Masier, G., and E. Villanueva (2011). Consumption and initial mortgage conditions. Evidence from survey data.
ECB Working Paper Series, 1297, February.
Mertens, K., and M. O. Ravn (2012). Empirical evidence on the aggregate effects of anticipated and unanticipated
US tax policy shocks. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4 (2), 145-81.
Misra, K., and P. Surico (2014). Consumption, income changes, and heterogeneity: evidence from two fiscal
stimulus programs. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6:4, 84-106.
Monasterio, C., I. Sa´nchez, and F. Blanco (1996). Equidad y estabilidad del sistema de pensiones espan˜ol. Fun-
dacio´n BBV.
OECD (2017). Pensions at a Glance 2017: OECD and G20 Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension glance-2017-en
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 48 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1913
Parker, J. A., N. S. Souleles, D. S. Johnson, and R. McClelland (2013). Consumer spending and the economic
stimulus payments of 2008. American Economic Review, 103 (6), 2530-2553.
Parraga-Rodriguez, S. (2016). The aggregate effect of government income transfers shocks - EU evidence, Banco
de Espan˜a working paper 1629.
Parraga-Rodriguez, S. (2018). The dynamic effect of public expenditure shocks in the United States, Journal of
Macroeconomics, 56, 340-360.
Petersen, M. (2009). Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. The Review of
Financial Studies, 22 (1), 435-480.
Pou, Ll. and J. Alegre (2002). La encuesta continua de preseupuestos familiares (1985-1996): descripcio´n, rep-
resentitividad y propuestas de metodologı´a para la explotacio´n de la informacio´n de los ingresos y el gasto.
FUNCAS Working Paper 172/2002.
Romer, C. and D. Romer (2016). Transfer Payments and the Macroeconomy: The Effects of Social Security
Benefit Increases, 1952-1991. American Economic Review, 8:4, 1-42.
Stephens, M. Jr. (2003) 3rd of tha month: Do Social Security recipients smooth consumption between checks?
American Economic Review, 93:1, 406-422.
Thompson, S. (2011). Simple formulas for standard errors that cluster by both firm and time. Journal of Financial
Economics, 99, 110.
Wilcox D. W. (1989). Social security benefits, consumption expenditure, and the life cycle hypothesis. Journal
of Political Economy, 97, 288304.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1913
Figure A1: Weight in the Budget of the Different Social Security Benefits
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Figure A1 shows that old-age benefits accounted for more than half the expenditure on public
pensions. Here, notice that the government paid disability benefits after the beneficiary was 65
years old until 1997. Since 1998, recipients of disability benefits have been transferred to old-
age pensions when they turn 65. At the time of the change, the weight of old age pensions in the
Social Security’s budget increased about 10 pp. Survivors benefits include benefits for widows,
orphans, and other relatives. Although there were some special subsidies, non-contributory
pensions did not exist until 1991. Data from Economic-Financial Reports to the Social Security
budget.
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A2 Narrative series of pension-related policies in Spain
Table A1 summarizes all exogenous pension-related policies corresponding to 1979q1 to 1997q4.
For each policy, the table reports the source, the enactment and implementation date, a short de-
scription, the motivation and the estimated annualized impact in millions of pesetas of 1992.
While the sources where all in Spanish, this table provides a useful summary in English. A
more detailed account of each policy, including quotes and explanations for the motivations,
is available upon request.About the date of legislation and implementation, these correspond,
respectively, to the day of passing the corresponding piece of legislation and the day when it
becomes effective. Finally, the acronyms PP, I, and R represent the motivations, which stand
for, respectively, Purchasing Power, Ideology and structural Reform.
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Table A1: Exogenous Pension-Related Policies
Source Enactment Implementation Description Motivation Mill pts
of 1992
The Spanish Constitution 29/12/1978 29/12/1978 Article 41 provides the legal framework to the
system of public pensions.
. . . . . .
Royal Decree Law 43/1978, De-
cember 21 of 1978; Royal De-
cree Law 35/1978, November 16
of 1978.
16/11/1978 01/01/1979 New war pensions derived from the Spanish
Civil War.
I 13,059
Royal Decree 47/1980 11/01/1980 01/02/1980 Adjustment social security pensions below CPI
inflation.
PP -45,133
Discretional rise of minimum pensions below
CPI inflation.
I -1,436
Law 5/1979, September 18 of
1979
16/11/1979 01/01/1980 New war pensions derived from the Spanish
Civil War.
I 47,087
Law 35/1980, June 26 of 1980 16/10/1980 10/01/1980 New war pensions derived from the Spanish
Civil War.
I 47,087
Law 74/1980 General State Bud-
get for 1981
29/12/1980 01/01/1981 Increase in spending on war pensions derived
from the Spanish Civil War.
I 34,300
Newspapers. Special government
report BOE 18/12/1995, 184, E.
07/05/1981 07/05/1981 Extraordinary expenses due to the break-out of
the Toxic Oil Syndrome.
I 4,413
Royal Decree 77/1981 16/01/1981 01/01/1981 Adjustment social security pensions above CPI
inflation.
PP 5,951
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 6,129
Law 44/1981 General State Bud-
get for 1982
28/01/1981 01/01/1982 Increase in spending on war pensions derived
from the Spanish Civil War.
I 6,419
Royal Decree 3218/1981 29/12/1981 01/01/1982 Adjustment social security pensions below CPI
inflation.
PP -98,008
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Table A1 – Continued from previous page
Source Enactment Implementation Description Motivation Mill pts
of 1992
Discretional rise of minimum pensions below
CPI inflation.
I -30,816
Royal Decree 93/1983 19/01/1983 23/01/1983 Adjustment social security pensions above CPI
inflation.
PP 10,302
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 40,258
Newspapers. Constitutional
Court Ruling 103/1983
22/11/1983 04/01/1983 Equation of the criteria required to collect sur-
vivors [widows] benefits for men and women.
R 39,331
Law 9/1983 General State Budget
for 1983
13/07/1983 01/08/1983 Increase in spending on war pensions derived
from the Spanish Civil War.
I 47,345
Royal Decree 383/1984 01/02/1984 01/04/1984 New pensions for the social integration of the
disabled
I 1,511
Law 37/1984 22/10/1984 01/01/1985 New war pensions derived from the Spanish
Civil War.
I 11,988
Law 50/1984 General State Bud-
get for 1985
30/12/1984 01/01/1985 Adjustment social security pensions below CPI
inflation.
PP -19,811
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 12,075
Extension of pensions for the social integration
of the disabled.
I 1,040
Law 26/1985 31/07/1985 01/08/1985 Reform of contributory old age pensions. R -117,762
Introduction of automatic indexation begining
in 1986.
Law 46/1985 General State Bud-
get for 1986
27/12/1985 01/01/1986 Adjustment social security pensions below CPI
inflation.
PP -3,406
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 22,187
Suprem Court ruling Ar. 1741 10/04/1986 01/05/1986 Change in the criteria granting pensions for the
disabled.
R 3,332
Law 21/1986 General State Bud-
get for 1987
23/12/1986 01/01/1987 Increase in spending on war pensions derived
from the Spanish Civil War.
I 13,560
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Table A1 – Continued from previous page
Source Enactment Implementation Description Motivation Mill pts
of 1992
Adjustment social security pensions above CPI
inflation.
PP 11,804
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 28,245
Increase in spending on pensions for the dis-
abled.
I 9,133
Law 33/1987 General State Bud-
get for 1988
23/12/1987 01/01/1988 Increase in spending on war pensions derived
from the Spanish Civil War.
I 24,832
Adjustment social security pensions below CPI
inflation.
PP -21,242
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 29,369
Increase in spending on pensions for the dis-
abled.
I 19,543
Lower retirement age for FAS pensions. I 7,488
Law 37/1988 General State Bud-
get for 1989
28/12/1988 01/01/1989 Increase in spending on war pensions derived
from the Spanish Civil War.
I 1,732
Adjustment social security pensions below CPI
inflation.
PP -28,096
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 40,411
Discretional rise of FAS pensions. I 5,922
Increase in spending on pensions for the dis-
abled.
I 4,925
Law 4/1990 General State Budget
for 1990
29/06/1990 01/07/1990 Increase in spending on war pensions derived
from the Spanish Civil War.
I 14,416
Increase in spending on pensions for the dis-
abled.
I 4,141
Royal Decree Law 7/1989 29/12/1989 01/01/1990 Adjustment social security pensions above CPI
inflation.
PP 31,690
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 80,329
Law 31/1990 General State Bud-
get for 1991
27/12/1990 01/01/1991 Increase in spending on war pensions derived
from the Spanish Civil War.
I 45,922
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Table A1 – Continued from previous page
Source Enactment Implementation Description Motivation Mill pts
of 1992
Adjustment social security pensions above CPI
inflation.
PP 23,981
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 32,796
Lower retirement age of FAS pensions. I 1,369
Law 26/1990 20/12/1990 01/01/1991 Introduction of non-contributory pensions in the
system of Social Security.
I 9,826
Law 31/1991 General State Bud-
get for 1992
30/12/1991 01/01/1992 Fall in spending on war pensions due to ageing
of the beneficiaries.
I -458
Adjustment social security pensions above CPI
inflation.
PP 15,566
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 51,997
Extension of non-contributory pensions. I 40,718
Law 39/1992 General State Bud-
get for 1993
30/12/1991 01/01/1993 Adjustment social security pensions above CPI
inflation.
PP 11,698
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 6,236
Extension of non-contributory pensions. Signif-
icant transfer of beneficiaries from other pro-
grams of social assistance. Adjustment of ex-
istent non-contributory pensions above CPI in-
flation.
I 23,195
Royal Decree Law 1/1994 20/06/1994 01/09/1994 Consolidation of the General Law on Social Se-
curity
Law 21/1993 General State Bud-
get for 1994
29/12/1994 01/01/1995 Extension of non-contributory pensions. Signif-
icant transfer of beneficiaries from other pro-
grams of social assistance. New pensions for
the elderly emigrants.
I 13,965
Law 41/1994 General State Bud-
get for 1995
30/12/1994 01/01/1995 Extension of non-contributory pensions. Sig-
nificant transfer of beneficiaries from other pro-
grams of social assistance.
I 10,129
Royal Decree 728/1993 14/05/1993 01/01/1995 New pensions for the elderly emigrants I 6,538
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Table A1 – Continued from previous page
Source Enactment Implementation Description Motivation Mill pts
of 1992
Royal Decree-Law 12/1995 28/12/1995 01/01/1996 Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 4,879
Adjustment social security pensions above CPI
inflation.
I 5,722
Extension of non-contributory pensions. Signif-
icant transfer of beneficiaries from other pro-
grams of social assistance. Adjustment of ex-
istent non-contributory pensions above CPI in-
flation.
I 5,722
Law 12/1996 General State Bud-
get for 1997
30/12/1996 01/01/1997 Adjustment social security pensions above CPI
inflation.
PP 23,651
Discretional rise of minimum pensions. I 9,703
Extension of non-contributory pensions. Signif-
icant transfer of beneficiaries from other pro-
grams of social assistance. Adjustment of ex-
istent non-contributory pensions above CPI in-
flation.
I 8,119
Law 24/1997 15/07/1997 01/08/1997 Reform of old age and survivors [orphans] pen-
sions.
R -13,520
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A3 Items by category of expenditure
Table A2: Items by Category of Expenditure
Expenditure Items
Food Rice, flour, bread, cereals, pulse, cakes, pasta, meat, delicatessen, fish,
shellfish, milk, yogurt, butter, cheese, eggs, oil, fruit, juice, nuts, veg-
etables, potatoes, sugar, coffee, tea, cocoa, jelly, honey, chocolate, ice
creams, spices, mineral water, other non-alcoholic drinks.
Shelter Rent (real or imputed); bills including local taxes, trash taxes, water,
electricity, telephone, heating, house community expenditures; house
repairs; cleaning products and services.
Apparel Clothes, footwear, and accessories including repairs.
Leisure Media (phones, TVs, laptops, etc.), sports equipment, books, instru-
ments, other small gadgets for leisure and repairs; shows (cinema, the-
ater, concerts, etc.), museums, pet and garden care expenditures, journal
and magazines, stationery, bars and restaurants, hotels, holidays, bet
games, and other services for leisure and culture.
Furnishings Furniture, house textile, large and small appliances (microwaves,
fridges, blenders, etc.), tableware, garden tools, electric material, and
repairs.
Transport Vehicles and spare parts, repairs in a garage, fuel and lubricants, car
renting, insurances, parking expenditures, tolls, urban transport (sub-
way, bus, etc.), cabs, trains, air transport, sea transport, telegraph, and
postal expenditures.
Non-Durables Food and non-alcoholic beverages, shows, pet and garden care expen-
ditures, press and stationery, bars and restaurants, hotels, holidays, bet
games, hairdresser, stylist, beauty products, services fees, donation to
other members of the household, donation to other households or insti-
tutions, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and cigarettes, medicines, medical
services, education.
Durables apparel, furnishings, vehicles and spare parts, media equipment, sports
equipment, books (including textbooks), instruments, orthopedic mate-
rial, tombstones, jewelry, suitcases, buggies, small personal appliances
(e.g., electric razor).
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A4 Imputation of capital income to pensioners in the EPC
Figure A3 shows the empirical distribution of the predicted probabilities from the estimation
of a probit model for whether households own an average level of capital income above the
median on household characteristics common to the EPC and the ECPF85. The covariates
include the age, sex and education of the reference person, the household size, a dummy for
whether the household owns real estate, and regional dummies. The histograms show a similar
profile, albeit more households have intermediate predicted probabilities in the EPC. This is
partly compensated by more predicted probabilities close to zero in the ECPF85. All in all,
more probabilities below 0.5 were predicted for the EPC.
Pensioners in the EPC were assigned a level of capital income above the median (y = 1)
if their predicted probabilities were in the upper half of the distribution of probabilities. This
classification implies similar characteristics for pensioners with y = 1 in both surveys (Table
A3).
Alternatively, we could use the one-time survey of 1980-81 to estimate the probabilities
that pensioners have a positive level of capital income. However, less than 50% of pensioners
reported a definite amount of capital income. As a result, the probit model was modified such
that the dependent variable y = 1 if the pensioners reported a positive level of capital income,
and zero otherwise.
Again, pensioners in the EPC were assigned a positive level of capital income (y = 1) if
their predicted probabilities were in the upper half of the distribution of probabilities. Table
A4 shows that this classification implies crucial differences between pensioners with y = 1 in
either survey, especially the number of observations and their tenure of real estate, an essential
component of wealth. Even so, Figure A4 shows that the estimated effects on spending using
these alternative probabilities are halfway the effects grouping pensioners according to their real
estate, and using the ECPF85 to determine the likelihood that pensioners have a level of capital
income above the median.
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Table A3: Predicted Charateristics of Pensioners with Capital Income Above the Median in the
EPC based on the ECPF85
EPC ECPF85
y = 1 48.0% 50.0%
Age 71 70
Woman 17.9% 25.9%
Primary education 86.8% 86.9%
Home owner 95.1% 98.5%
Other real estate 23.2% 20.7%
Ratio 80/20 total expenditure 2.7 2.3
Figure A2: Empirical Distribution of Predicted Probabilities by Survey
Table A4: Predicted Charateristics of Pensioners with a Positive Capital Income in the EPC
based on the EPF80/81
EPC EPF80/81
y = 1 50.9% 36.2%
Age 72 71
Woman 18.2% 25.8%
Primary education 86.1% 89.6%
Home owner 87.1% 77.1%
Other real estate 18.4% 4.9%
Ratio 80/20 total expenditure 3.8 3.7
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Figure A3: Empirical Distribution of Predicted Probabilities by Survey
Notes: The dark lines with marker report the response of pensioners with a positive level of capital income to an
increase of 1,000 pesetas in the average pension. The light lines with marker report the response of pensioners with
no capital income. The solid lines and shaded area report 95 confidence level intervals. Predicted probabilities
for observations without information on household income using the EPF80/81. (Censored) Median regression
estimates for (durables) total expenditure, non-durables, and food. Regressions include controls for household
characteristics and time effects. Estimation sample 1977q2 to 1997q1; Observations 130,621.
Figure A4: Effects on Spending by Quantile of Household Expenditure, Grouping of Pensioners
Based on their Capital Income
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A5 A simulation exercise for the confidence intervals
This appendix presents a simple simulation exercise to compare the efficiency of alternative
methods to compute standard errors for quantile regression with dependent data. In a recent
paper, Parente and Santos Silva (2016) developed a standardized routine to compute clustered
standard errors for quantile regression estimates. Machado, Santos Silva and Wei (2016) prove
the necessary modifications for the method to be applied to quantile regressions for corner solu-
tions data. Alternatively, the influential paper by Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) suggests a bootstrap
method to compute standard errors for (censored) quantile regression estimates when the data
are dependent. The bootstrap samples are generated by repeatedly drawing (with replacement)
a unit from the sample of G groups, and including all observations for such unit. However, it
appears that so far does not exist a formal comparison of both methods to guide the empirical
researcher. The gap is even more so for censored quantile regression. Thus, this appendix con-
tributes to the discussion with a simulation exercise that compares the efficiency of the clustered
and bootstrap-computed confidence intervals for censored quantile regression with dependent
data.
The exercise uses a simple linear model with one covariate such that
y = max{0,−0.5+ x+(0.25+0.25x)e}
x,e ∼ N(0,1)
The number of observations is set to 10,000 and the number of clusters to 1,250. The average
number of observations per cluster is 8, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 18 observations
per cluster. The relation between the number of observations and the number of clusters has
been chosen to resemble the Spanish ECPF85 household expenditure survey. Moreover, to
mimic real applications, I draw 200 bootstrap samples (see Kowalski 2016).
The first subplot of Figure A5 shows the censored quantile estimates along with the normal
based 95 percent confidence intervals using either method. For the bootstrap method, the con-
fidence intervals are obtained as the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of the bootstrap coefficients. In
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a standard desktop computer, the cluster-method (solid and red lines) took 16 seconds, while
the bootstrap-method (dashed and black lines) took 38 minutes and 28 seconds. These timings
side with the known unfeasibility of bootstrap methods in similar real applications, which may
involve a more substantial number of covariates and/or observations. On the other hand, both
methods yield similar confidence intervals, albeit clustered standard errors tend to be slightly
tighter (second subplot).
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Figure A5: Simulation Results
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